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In speaking, semantic encoding is the conversion of a non-verbal mental representation
(the reference) into a semantic structure suitable for expression (the sense). In this fMRI
study on sentence production we investigate how the speaking brain accomplishes this
transition from non-verbal to verbal representations. In an overt picture description task,
we manipulated repetition of sense (the semantic structure of the sentence) and refer-
ence (the described situation) separately. By investigating brain areas showing response
adaptation to repetition of each of these sentence properties, we disentangle the neu-
ronal infrastructure for these two components of semantic encoding. We also performed
a control experiment with the same stimuli and design but without any linguistic task to
identify areas involved in perception of the stimuli per se. The bilateral inferior parietal
lobes were selectively sensitive to repetition of reference, while left inferior frontal gyrus
showed selective suppression to repetition of sense. Strikingly, a widespread network of
areas associated with language processing (left middle frontal gyrus, bilateral superior pari-
etal lobes and bilateral posterior temporal gyri) all showed repetition suppression to both
sense and reference processing.These areas are probably involved in mapping reference
onto sense, the crucial step in semantic encoding. These results enable us to track the
transition from non-verbal to verbal representations in our brains.
Keywords: semantics, conceptual representation, language production, fMRI, fMRI adaptation
INTRODUCTION
Look at that guy hitting the other guy! After reading this sentence,
you presumably have a mental representation of two adult male
persons, of whom one is hitting the other. They are both male
and adult but they are still two different persons. A linguistic dis-
tinctionwithinthedomainof semantics,isthedifferencebetween
reference and sense of a linguistic expression (Frege, 1892). The
sense of an expression is its linguistic meaning,the reference is the
entity the expression refers to. In the representation of the sen-
tence Look at that guy hitting the other guy! there are two guys (for
instance a blond and a dark-haired guy,as indicated by“that”and
“the other”), but they are both referred to by the same sense, the
word guy (an adult male person). This sense thus has two possible
references. The reverse is also possible. If you knew more about
the two guys you might be shouting: Look at that man hitting his
son! in the same situation. His son and the other guy are then two
possible senses which can have the same referent.
Intheviewof Jackendoff (2002),whichweadoptinthecurrent
paper, referents are representations in our minds. For concrete
objects they are representations in our minds, of objects in the
real world, constructed by the perceptual system. These represen-
tations are considered concepts, which thus are non-linguistic in
nature. Sense, then, is that part of meaning that is encoded in
the form of the utterance. In other words, sense (linguistic mean-
ing) is the interface between the conceptual system and linguistic
form (spanning both phonology and syntax; Jackendoff, 2002).
Speakingistheconversionof anintentiontocommunicateames-
sage into a linearized string of speech sounds. An essential step in
thisprocessissemanticencoding–theretrievaloftherelevantcon-
cepts and the speciﬁcation of semantic structure (Levelt,1989). In
this step,the intended reference needs to be mapped onto a sense,
for it to be expressed. In this mapping process, certain semantic
choices have to be made, such as referring to the entities in the
referential domain by, for instance,“the guy” or “the man on the
chair.”From a processing point of view, then, reference forms the
input to semantic encoding, while sense is the output. Semantic
encodingitself isthecomputationnecessarytomapreference(the
input) onto the sense (the output) in order to generate the appro-
priate output. In this paper, we consider sense to be equivalent to
the preverbal message in sentence production (Levelt, 1989). The
preverbal message is the semantic structure that forms the output
of semantic encoding and the input to syntactic and phonological
encoding.
In speaking establishing reference is the ﬁrst step of seman-
tic encoding, necessary to utter a sentence in the ﬁrst place. As
few neuroimaging studies investigating semantic encoding in sen-
tence production have so far been conducted, in this fMRI study
we aim to ﬁll that gap. Picture naming paradigms have previ-
ously been used in fMRI albeit in single word studies. Retrieving
a name for a picture has been shown to involve more activ-
ity in bilateral temporal areas, the left frontal lobe, bilateral
occipital areas, bilateral parietal areas, and the anterior cingulate
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(Kan and Thompson-Schill, 2004) than does making visual deci-
sionsaboutabstractpictures.Asimilarsetof areashasbeenshown
toincreaseactivityinpicturenamingandreadingaloudcompared
to counting (Parker Jones et al., 2011). These data suggest that
a large network of areas may be involved in semantic encoding.
Also,whilepartofthisnetworkarewell-establishedlanguageareas,
somearenot.Perhaps,then,theseareareasencodingthereference
for these materials.
Moving on to sentence production, in a previous fMRI adap-
tation study on sentence-level processing, we compared the neu-
ronal structure underlying computation of semantic structure of
an utterance in comprehension and production (Menenti et al.,
2011). More speciﬁcally, we investigated the construction of the-
matic role structure, the relation between the different concepts
and events,or“who does what to whom.”This aspect of semantic
structure forms a crucial interface between conceptual structure
(the domain of reference) and syntactic structure (the grammati-
cal roles). Schematically a thematic role structure can be stated as
a predicate with arguments: ROB(THIEF, LADY(OLD)). There is
a “ROB” event, performed by a THIEF (the agent of the action)
to the expenses of a LADY (the patient of the action), who has
the property of being OLD. In our study, photographs depicting
transitive events (events requiring an agent and a patient, such as
ROB, KISS, HIT) provided the context for the sentences, which
wereeitherproducedorheardbytheparticipants.Wefoundbilat-
eralposteriormiddletemporalgyriinvolvedinthiscomponentof
sentence processing.
While this study provided valuable insights on the neuronal
infrastructure underlying different steps in sentence production
and comprehension, the semantic encoding manipulation dis-
regarded the distinction between reference and sense. The next
question, and the one underlying the present study, then, is how
thedifferentareasinvolvedinsemanticencodingplayaroleinpro-
cessing the input (reference), the output (sense), and the process
of mapping the one onto the other. In this sentence production
fMRIadaptationstudyweagainfocusedonthematicrolestructure
as an essential part of semantic structure. In a picture descrip-
tion paradigm, we manipulated repetition of semantic structure
across subsequent sentences, crossing repetition of reference and
sense.
Our paradigm involved pictures of transitive events being
enacted by two actors. We operationalized sense as the literal
sentence used to describe the picture. Reference we considered
the sum of the action involved, the roles of actors as agents and
patients,andtheexactspatialconﬁgurationofagentsandpatients.
In our task, the actors in the picture were colored and these
colors varied for the same depicted situation. Participants could
therefore subsequently describe the same situation as“The yellow
manhitsthebluewoman.”andthenas“Theredmanhitsthegreen
woman.” Although the picture therefore looked slightly different
in the two trials, the colors were an arbitrarily varying property
of the individuals in the picture and the participants were made
aware of this (see Materials and Methods). We do not consider
such arbitrary variations to be part of reference. One might con-
sider this parallel to the fact that we change clothes every day:
theymakeuslookdifferentbutdonottherebycauseustobecome
differentindividuals.Thereferenceof theexpressionwastherefore
kept constant but the sense changed. In a complementary fash-
ion, the sentence “The red man hits the green woman.” could
be used in subsequent trials to describe a different hitting event
involving different participants. Sense was kept constant, but the
reference changed. This allowed us to distinguish the situation the
participants spoke about from the utterance they used to speak
about it.
As can be seen in Figure 1, this means that our relevant“novel
reference”condition still has considerable overlap with the prime.
We chose this approach to eliminate any potential confounds. For
instance, repeating the actors between prime and“repeated refer-
ence” target but not between prime and “novel reference” target
would leave effects open to, for instance, the alternative interpre-
tation that we are looking at face repetition effects. By choosing
the most narrow comparison possible,we can be more sure of the
interpretation of the results, while admittedly running the risk of
missing some other potentially relevant effects.
To further investigate the distinction between non-verbal and
verbalprocessingofmeaning,weperformedacontrolexperiment.
In this experiment we showed participants the exact same stimu-
lus sequences,but this time paired with a non-linguistic task. Any
brainareasinvolvedinprocessingonlythenon-linguistic,concep-
tual representations involved in interpreting the pictures (i.e., the
reference), should also show an adaptation effect without a lin-
guistic task. On the other hand,brain areas involved in converting
meaning into language (the sense), should not show adaptation
e f f e c t si ns u c has e t t i n g .
Our hypothesis was that areas involved in processing the con-
ceptualinputtosemanticencodingshouldshowadaptationeffects
for repetition of reference in both the speaking and control exper-
iments, while not showing sensitivity to repetition of sense. Areas
involved in semantic encoding itself,that is,in mapping reference
onto sense, should show adaptation to repetition of both refer-
ence and sense. Finally, areas involved in processing the output of
semantic encoding, the sense, should show adaptation to repeti-
tion of sense in the speaking experiment, and should not show
sensitivity to repetition of reference.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-four right-handed subjects took part in each experiment
(speaking: 12 female; mean age 25.2years, SD 7.5; control: 13
female; mean age 22.8years, SD 3.17). All subjects were healthy
native Dutch speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision
and had attended or were attending university education in the
Netherlands. All subjects gave written informed consent prior
to the experiment and received a fee or course credit for their
participation. No participants took part in both experiments.
STIMULI
Our target stimulus set contained 1152 photographs that depicted
36 transitive events such as kiss, help, strangle with the agent
and patient of this action. Four couples performed each action
(2×men/women; 2×boy/girl), in two conﬁgurations (one with
the man/boy as the agent and one with the woman/girl). These
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FIGURE 1 | Design and stimuli. Subjects described scenes with short
sentences containing action, agent, and patient and their respective
colors.There are four factors (words, sense, actors, reference), with two
levels (repeated/novel) each. Separate repetition of sense and individual
words allows distinguishing areas that are sensitive to the overall
meaning of a sentence from those that are sensitive to repetition of
words but not to repetition of sentence meaning. Separate repetition of
actors and reference allows distinguishing areas that are sensitive to the
overall situation from those that are sensitive to the people involved
irrespective of the speciﬁc situation.The four factors cannot be fully
crossed, since it is not possible to repeat sense without, at least partly,
repeating words, as it is not possible to repeat a situation while changing
the people involved.Therefore, each of the factors varies only at one level
of the factor it could potentially be confounded with.The contrasts of
interest are between the middle and right column for sense (hence
keeping repetition of words controlled) and between the middle and
bottom row for reference (hence keeping repetition of actors controlled).
Likewise, the effect of word repetition was computed by comparing the
leftmost and middle column, and the effect of actor repetition by
comparing the top and middle row.
36×4×2 pictures were further edited so that the agent and
patient each had a different color (red–green, green–red, blue–
yellow, yellow–blue), and these 36×4×2×4 pictures were also
ﬂipped so that the position of the agent could be either left or
right on the picture. The ﬁller stimuli contained pictures depict-
ing 868 intransitive (e.g., The boy runs.) and 160 locative (e.g.,
The balls lie on the table.) events. The actors and objects in these
pictures were also colored in red, green, yellow or blue. The
control experiment further included catch stimuli, which consti-
tuted 10% of the trials. These were pictures similar to the target
pictures, but containing a range of visual defects that the sub-
jects had to detect. The stimuli are available for use from the
authors.
DESIGN
The design is illustrated in Figure 1, and was identical for both
experiments. There were four factors (words, sense, actors, refer-
ence), with two levels (repeated/novel) each. Contrasting repeti-
tion of sense and individual words allowed us to distinguish areas
that are sensitive to the overall meaning of a sentence, and those
that are sensitive to repetition of words but not to repetition of
sentence meaning. The verb and nouns were always repeated for
targettrials,andonlytheadjectivescouldvary.Thiswasnecessary
due to the constraints on repetition of elements in the pictures for
the different conditions. For instance, since “repeated reference”
entailed repeating both the action and the people involved, this
meant also repeating the words used to refer to these elements.
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Contrasting repetition of actors and reference allowed us to
distinguish areas that are sensitive to the overall situation from
those that are sensitive to the people involved irrespective of the
speciﬁcsituation.Thefourfactorscouldnotbefullycrossed,since
it is not possible to repeat sense without, at least partly, repeat-
ing words, like it is not possible to repeat an event (the reference)
while changing the people involved. Therefore, we performed the
relevant comparison for each factor at only one level of the factor
it could potentially be confounded with (see Figure 1).
Thetargetitemswerepresentedin78mini-blockswithanaver-
age length of 5.4 items (range 3–7 items). The target blocks were
alternated with ﬁller blocks, with an average length of 3.5 items.
Filler blocks served the purpose of increasing variability in syn-
tacticstructures,words,andvisualpropertiesof thesentencesand
pictures. Subjects were unaware of the division in blocks, as the
items were presented at a constant rate. We used a running prim-
ing paradigm where each target item also served as prime for the
subsequent target item. No condition was repeated twice in a row.
Since there were 78 target blocks, 78 transitive items (the ﬁrst of
eachmini-block)servedasprimesonly.Theremaining315transi-
tive items (2–6 per block depending on block length) constituted
the target trials so that there were 35 items per condition. Each
subject saw a different randomized list, which consisted of 393
transitive (78 prime-only and 315 target items) stimuli and 262
ﬁller stimuli. For the speaking experiment, these were randomly
sampled from the 868 intransitive and 160 locative pictures in the
ﬁllerstimulusset.Inthecontrolexperiment,the262pictureswere
always 65 catch (10% of total number of trials), 67 locative and
130 intransitive pictures.
TASK AND PROCEDURE
Speaking experiment: participants ﬁrst read the instructions and
were given the opportunity to ask questions. The instructions not
only explained the task, but also introduced all the different fre-
quently occurring actors as separate individuals, along with the
same photo of them in every color. This way, we made sure that
theparticipantswereawarethatthecolorswerearbitrarilyvarying
properties of the different actors.
Each target picture was preceded by its corresponding verb.
Participants described the picture with a short sentence, using
the presented verb. In this sentence they had to mention both
persons and their colors. The experiment consisted of two runs
of 39min. This served the purpose of not keeping partici-
pants in the MRI-scanner for too long; the runs were other-
wise completely equivalent. The participants underwent a 5-
min anatomical scan after the ﬁrst run, and were then taken
out of the MR-scanner for a break before they underwent the
second run. The responses were recorded in order to extract
reaction times (RTs). The experimenter coded the participant’s
responses online for correctness and prevoicing. Prevoicing was
codedtoensurecorrectmeasurementofRTs,whichwereextracted
through thresholding of the speech recording (see below for
details). Each trial lasted 7000ms and consisted of the follow-
ing events: the verb was presented with a jittered start time
of 0–1000ms after the start of the trial, and a duration of
500ms. After an ISI of 500–2500ms the picture was presented
for 2000ms.
Controlexperiment:participantsﬁrstreadtheinstructionsand
weregiventheopportunitytoaskquestions.Theparticipant’stask
was to act as a “proof viewer” scanning a set of pictures for mis-
prints. They were given examples of both correct pictures and
possible misprints. They were instructed to press a button when-
ever they detected a misprint, and to do nothing if the pictures
were ok. The experiment consisted of two runs of 22min. The
participants underwent a 5-min anatomical scan between runs.
Each trial lasted 4000ms, in which the picture was displayed with
a jittered start time of 0–1500ms from trial onset, and stayed on
screen for 1000ms. We chose different timing parameters for this
experiment, to avoid it becoming incredibly boring.
DATA ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS
Dataacquisitiontookplaceina3-TSiemensMagnetomTim-Trio
MRI-scanner. Participants were scanned using a 12-channel sur-
face coil. To acquire our functional data we used parallel-acquired
inhomogeneity-desensitized fMRI (Poser et al., 2006). This is a
multi-echo EPI: images are acquired at multiple TE’s following
a single excitation. The TR was 2398ms and each volume con-
sisted of 31 slices of 3mm thickness with a slice-gap of 17%. The
voxel size was 3.5mm×3.5mm×3mm and the ﬁeld of view was
224mm.FunctionalscanswereacquiredatmultipleTEsfollowing
a single excitation (TE1 at 9.4ms, TE2 at 21.2ms, TE3 at 33ms,
TE4 at 45ms, and TE5 at 56ms with echo spacing of 0.5ms) so
that there was a broadened T∗
2 coverage. Because T∗
2 mixes into
the ﬁve echoes in a different way, the estimate of T∗
2 is improved.
Accelerated parallel imaging reduces image artifacts and thus is
a good method to acquire data when participants are producing
sentences in the scanner (causing motion and susceptibility arti-
facts).Thenumberofslicesdidnotallowacquisitionofafullbrain
volume in most participants. We always made sure that the entire
temporal and frontal lobes were scanned because these were the
areas where the fMRI adaptation effects of interest were expected.
This meant however that data from the superior posterior frontal
lobe and the anterior superior parietal lobe (thus data from the
top of the head) were not acquired in several participants. The
functional scans of the ﬁrst and second runs were aligned using
AutoAlign. A whole-brain high resolution structural T1-weighted
MPRAGE sequence was performed to characterize participants’
anatomy (TR=2300ms, TE=3.03ms, 192 slices with voxel size
of 1mm3,FOV=256),acceleratedwithGRAPPAparallelimaging
(Griswold et al.,2002).
For the behavioral data of the speaking experiment,to separate
participants’ speech from the scanner sound and extract RTs, the
speechrecordingswerebandpassﬁlteredwithafrequencybandof
250–4000Hz and smoothed with a width half the sampling rate.
Response onsets and durations were determined through thresh-
olding of these ﬁltered recordings (basically, a post hoc voicekey)
and linked to the stimulus presentation times to extract the RTs
andtotalspeakingtimes.Trialswitherrorsorprevoicingweredis-
carded from the analysis. The planning times, speaking times and
total response times for correct responses to the target items were
analyzed in a repeated measures ANOVA using SPSS.
The fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed with SPM5
(Friston et al., 1995). The ﬁrst 5 images were discarded to allow
for T1 equilibration.Thentheﬁveechoesof theremainingimages
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were realigned to correct for motion artifacts (estimation of the
realignment parameters was done for one echo and then copied
to the other echoes). Subsequently the ﬁve echoes were combined
into one image with a method designed to ﬁlter task-correlated
motion out of the signal (Buur et al.,2009). First,echo two to ﬁve
(i.e., TE2,T E 3,T E 4, and TE5) were combined using a weighting
vector dependent on the measured differential contrast to noise
ratio per voxel. The time course of an image acquired at a very
shortechotime(i.e.,TE1)wasusedasavoxelwiseregressorinalin-
ear regression for the combined image of TE2,TE 3,TE 4,and TE5.
Weighting of echoes was calculated based on 25 volumes acquired
before the actual experiment started. The resulting images were
coregistered to the participants’ anatomical scan, normalized to
MNI space and spatially smoothed using a 3D isotropic Gaussian
smoothing kernel (FWHM=8mm).
Wethenperformedﬁrst-andsecond-levelstatistics.Fortheﬁrst
levelgenerallinearmodel(GLM),wemodeledtheindividualstart
time of the picture. The events of our model were convolved with
thecanonicalhemodynamicresponsefunctionincludedinSPM5.
In the speaking experiment, the ﬁrst level model included verbs,
ﬁllerpictures,primepictures,thenineconditionsanderrors.Erro-
neous responses were therefore put in a separate regressor,leaving
onlycorrectresponsesintheactualanalyses.Forthecontrolexper-
iment,theﬁrstlevelmodelincludedﬁllerpictures,primepictures,
the nine conditions,and catch trials. Both models included the six
motion parameters as event-related regressors of no interest. The
second-level model consisted of a 9 (condition)×2 (experiment)
factorial design. All effects were then tested by computing the
appropriate contrasts for the model. We performed two types of
analyses to test our hypotheses: to ﬁnd intersections between dif-
ferenteffects,weconductedconjunctionanalyses.Intheseanalyses
multiple different contrasts are tested, and only areas showing an
effect in all tested contrasts under a conjunction null hypothesis
resultinasigniﬁcantconjunction(Fristonetal.,2005).Tolookfor
areas sensitive to one factor but not the other, we applied exclu-
sive masking. In such an analysis, the signiﬁcant clusters for one
factor are overlaid with a low-threshold mask for the other factor
(p <0.20 uncorrected voxelwise), and only clusters that survive
the masking procedure are reported. Note that due to the very
nature of the type of statistical framework we employ, we cannot
prove that an effect does not exist. However, if an effect does not
survive thresholding at p <0.20 uncorrected voxelwise, it may be
said to be very weak at the very least. For all tests, the cluster size
at voxelwise threshold p <0.001 uncorrected was used as the test
statisticandonlyclusterssigniﬁcantatp <0.05correctedformul-
tiple non-independent comparisons are reported. Local maxima
are also reported for all clusters with their respective voxelwise
family wise error (FWE) corrected p-values. The effects for repe-
tition of words and actors are reported in the tables, but since the
aim of the study is to distinguish reference and sense we focus on
those two factors in discussing the results.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL DATA
For the speaking experiment, we performed repeated measures
GLMs on the planning times (RTs), speaking times (the dura-
tion of the response), and the total planning+speaking times.
The model included one factor (condition) with 9 levels, and the
three dependent variables. The effects reported were computed
through custom hypothesis tests within this model, using con-
trasts much like for the fMRI analyses. The data are reported in
Figure2. For planning times,repetition of sense,actors and refer-
ence produced signiﬁcant priming effects [words: F <1; sense:
F(1,23)=109.53, p <0.001; actors: F(1,23)=22.95, p <0.001;
reference: F(1,23)=94.60, p <0.001]. For speaking times, rep-
etition of reference and sense signiﬁcantly affected the dura-
tion of the response [words: F(1,23)=1.52, p <0.232; sense:
F(1,23)=12.31 p <0.002; actors: F(1,23)=3.71, p <0.066; ref-
erence:F(1,23)=9.50,p <0.005].However,thedirectionof these
effects was reversed. Priming led to shorter planning times but
longer speaking times. Analyses on the total time the partici-
pants took to complete the response (so planning plus speaking
time) again revealed signiﬁcant effects for reference and sense
[words: F(1,23)<1; sense: F(1,23)=13.41, p <0.001; actors:
F(1,23)=2.78, p <0.11; reference: F(1,23)=33.307, p <0.001].
Thetotalresponsetimemirroredtheplanningtimepattern:when
primed,subjects were faster to complete the response. There were
no signiﬁcant interactions in any of the analyses,in so far as these
could be computed given the design. In the control experiment,
the average d-prime was 0.7, indicating that participants did pay
attention.
fMRI RESULTS
AllresultsarereportedinTables1and2,anddepictedinFigure3.
Table 2 lists the main effects for all factors in the design; we limit
the discussion to the more speciﬁc results for reference and sense
as listed in Table 1.
Speaking experiment
The ﬁrst step in semantic encoding, the input, is to compute a
non-linguistic representation underlying the sentence to be pro-
duced. We therefore looked for areas exhibiting fMRI adaptation
to reference, while not showing an effect of sense repetition. The
BOLD-response of the bilateral temporo-parietal junctions (BA
39/37/19) and the precuneus decreased after repetition of refer-
ence.Intherightmiddlefrontalandinferiorgyrus(BA45/46)the
BOLD-response increased after repetition of reference.
The next step in semantic encoding, is to map the reference
onto a linguistic semantic structure that can be expressed, the
sense. This is the actual process of semantic encoding. We there-
fore tested for areas sensitive to repetition of both reference and
sense. The bilateral superior parietal lobes (BA 7), fusiform gyrus
(BA 37) and posterior middle temporal areas showed suppres-
sion in the conjunction analysis. The left calcarine sulcus (BA
17) exhibited suppression as well. Finally, three frontal clusters in
the left middle frontal gyrus, left SMA and left precentral gyrus
(all BA 6) also showed repetition suppression. We also tested for
increasedresponsesuponrepetition(enhancement),butfoundno
areas exhibiting this pattern.
Finally,themappingprocessproducesanoutput,thesense.This
should be reﬂected in regions showing fMRI adaptation to sense,
without showing an effect for reference. The BOLD-response of
the pars triangularis in the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45) was
reduced after repetition of sense. The response in the left angular
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FIGURE 2 | Behavioral data in the speaking experiment: reaction times (light shades), durations (dark shades), and total speaking times (total bar
length) for all conditions. Error bars represent SE of the mean of the total speaking times.
gyrus (BA 39/19) and in the left middle frontal gyrus (BA 44/9),
on the other hand, increased after repetition of sense.
Control experiment
In the process of semantic encoding, the input is the concep-
tual representation that has to be transformed into a preverbal
message. To some extent at least, such a representation should
also be constructed when we are not speaking. The only signif-
icant effect in the control experiment was indeed a main effect
of repetition of reference in bilateral posterior middle temporal
gyri/inferior parietal lobe (BA 37/39). This effect survived mask-
ing with sense in the control experiment, and was also the same
as the main effect of reference in the speaking experiment, as
demonstrated by a conjunction analysis (Table 3). The right mid-
dletemporalgyrus(BA21)showedenhancementuponrepetition
of reference.
DISCUSSION
In this sentence production study, we aimed to distinguish brain
areas sensitive to reference (the mental representation an utter-
ancerefersto)andthesense(thelinguisticstructurethatinterfaces
meaningwithlinguisticform).Thebehavioraldatainthespeaking
experiment showed that both reference and sense priming affect
the responses, and that these two effects do not interact. This
shows that both processes are psychologically real and distinct,
andthatprimingthemaffectsthespeedwithwhichasentencecan
be produced.
In speaking, constructing an utterance is an incremental
process, involving several steps (Levelt, 1989) .T h eﬁ r s ti st o
construct a preverbal message. In the present experiment, this
requires encoding the situation we want to talk about (MANa
hitting WOMANb) into a thematic role structure which can be
described as HIT(MAN(YELLOW), WOMAN(BLUE)): there is a
HIT event, performed by a MAN, who has the property of being
YELLOW, at the expenses of a WOMAN who has the property of
being BLUE (perhaps reasonable given that she is being HIT). As
outlined in the introduction, the input is the reference, the out-
put the sense. We wanted to ﬁnd out which areas in the brain are
involved in this mapping process. In the following, we will trace
step by step how, based on our results, we think the brain comes
to encode an utterance.
The ﬁrst step is to build a representation of a situation we are
going to talk about – the reference. This representation forms the
input to semantic encoding, and is non-linguistic (conceptual) in
nature. As outlined in the introduction, in the case of a concrete
referent this representation is the result of perceptual processes
within the perceptual system – in the present case, the visual sys-
tem. Presumably, such a representation is, at least to some extent,
built for what we perceive independently of whether we are going
totalkaboutitornot.Inthepresentparadigm,thisstepshouldbe
independentofthesenseoftheﬁnalutterance.Areasshowingsup-
pression to repetition of reference but not sense were the bilateral
occipito-temporo-parietal junctions (BA 37/39/19) and the pre-
cuneus. Data from the control experiment corroborate the idea
that the role of these areas in reference in the present experiment
is primarily to build a perceptual representation: the same bilat-
eral areas at the junction of the occipital, temporal and parietal
lobes show suppression to repetition of reference in the absence
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T a b l e1|O v e r l a pa n dsegregation of reference and sense.
Effect Cluster BA Anatomical label Global and local maxima Cluster-level Voxel-level
xyz K p T p (FWE)
Sense and reference 1 37 Fusiform_L −42 −60 −12 4162 0.000 5.95 0.000
7 Parietal_Sup_L −24 −62 54 5.57 0.001
7 Parietal_Sup_L −22 −72 44 5.33 0.004
2 6 Frontal_Mid_L −26 −8 50 728 0.000 5.73 0.001
6 Precentral_L −40 0 50 4.99 0.018
3 19 Occipital_Inf_R 44 −76 −2 1323 0.000 4.90 0.026
19 Occipital_Inf_R 38 −72 −8 4.86 0.030
37 Temporal_Mid_R 46 −66 10 4.41 0.161
4 6 Supp_Motor_Area_L −4 10 56 191 0.035 4.76 0.045
5 7 Parietal_Sup_R 26 −58 54 461 0.000 4.74 0.048
7 Parietal_Sup_R 24 −72 50 4.27 0.247
7 n/a 24 −48 48 3.94 0.583
6 6/44 Precentral_L −44 6 20 299 0.005 4.42 0.153
6 Precentral_L −42 −4 32 4.27 0.253
7 17 Calcarine_L −8 −92 6 329 0.003 4.08 0.423
17 Calcarine_L −10 −82 8 3.77 0.772
17 Calcarine_L −14 −68 8 3.74 0.807
Sense-suppression
(masked for reference)
1 n/a Frontal_Inf_Tri_L −34 18 24 186 0.039 4.71 0.054
45 Frontal_Inf_Tri_L −50 28 26 4.46 0.136
45 Frontal_Inf_Tri_L −38 26 26 4.10 0.409
Sense-enhancement
(masked for reference)
1 39 Angular_L −54 −58 36 497 0.000 5.85 0.000
19 Occipital_Mid_L −42 −74 38 4.23 0.283
2 9 Frontal_Mid_L −26 24 44 251 0.012 4.03 0.476
44 Frontal_Mid_L −42 18 40 4.01 0.501
Reference-suppression
(masked for sense)
1 39 Temporal_Mid_R 50 −66 20 805 0.000 9.44 0.000
39 Occipital_Mid_R 42 −74 26 8.09 0.000
37 Temporal_Mid_R 60 −60 12 7 .81 0.000
2 39 Temporal_Mid_L −42 −68 20 617 0.000 8.99 0.000
39 Temporal_Mid_L −54 −66 18 7 .37 0.000
19 Occipital_Mid_L −30 −78 32 5.35 0.002
3 23 Precuneus_R 4 −58 24 1389 0.000 5.56 0.001
n/a Precuneus_R 2 −54 40 5.24 0.006
n/a Precuneus_L −10 −50 52 5.16 0.009
Reference-enhancement
(masked for sense)
1 45 Frontal_Mid_R 38 46 10 416 0.001 4.79 0.040
46 Frontal_Inf_Orb_R 44 48 −4 4.31 0.218
Listed are the MNI-coordinates for the ﬁrst three local maxima for each signiﬁcant cluster in the relevant comparisons (p<0.05 corrected cluster-level, threshold
p<0.001 uncorrected voxelwise, exclusive masks p<0.20 uncorrected voxel-wise). Anatomical labels are derived from the Automatic Anatomical Labeling atlas
(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) and from Brodmann’s atlas. Cluster-level statistics are listed for each cluster, voxel-level statistics also for local maxima.
of a linguistic task. The ﬁnding that these areas are involved in
generating the non-linguistic representation to refer to now also
allows us to further specify a previous ﬁnding on semantic encod-
inginsentenceproduction:inapreviousstudy,wefoundthatpart
of the superior right MTG is sensitive to sentence- but not word-
levelmeaning(Menentietal.,submitted).Thiseffectoverlapswith
the area sensitive to repeated reference but not sense, and there-
fore was presumably due to the encoding of the referent as well.
These same regions have also been found sensitive to subsequent
memoryforshortstories(Hassonetal.,2007),afurtherindication
thattheyareinvolvedinconstructingarepresentationof whatlin-
guistic material refers to. Repetition of reference did not just elicit
suppression: in right inferior frontal gyrus the response increased
upon repeated presentation. The repetition enhancement effect
for reference in right inferior frontal cortex was particularly strik-
ing since large parts of contralateral left inferior frontal cortex
showed repetition suppression for reference. Repetition enhance-
ment has been postulated to be caused, among other things, by
novel network formation due to the construction of new repre-
sentations (Henson et al., 2000; Conrad et al., 2007; Gagnepain
et al., 2008; Segaert et al., submitted). In speech comprehen-
sion, right inferior frontal cortex has previously been implicated
in the construction of a situation model (Menenti et al., 2009;
Tesink et al., 2009), a mental representation of text containing
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Table 2 | Main effects for all factors in the design.
Effect Cluster BA Anatomical label Global and local maxima Cluster-level Voxel-level
xyz K p T p (FWE)
Main effect words No signiﬁcant clusters
Main effect sense 1 6 Supp_Motor_Area_L −4 8 54 1389 0.000 7 .71 0.000
n/a n/a −10 20 22 4.44 0.146
n/a Cingulum_Mid_L −10 16 32 4.12 0.387
2 7 Occipital_Mid_L −26 −60 42 5208 0.000 6.63 0.000
2 Parietal_Inf_L −46 −38 50 6.07 0.000
37 Fusiform_L −42 −60 −12 5.95 0.000
3 6 Precentral_L −46 −2 34 3488 0.000 6.53 0.000
6 Precentral_L −46 0 42 6.23 0.000
44 Frontal_Inf_Oper_L −46 8 22 6.18 0.000
4 n/a Thalamus_L −10 −14 10 983 0.000 5.33 0.004
n/a Thalamus_L −4 −20 12 4.99 0.018
n/a Thalamus_R 4 −18 6 4.61 0.079
5 19 Occipital_Inf_R 44 −76 −2 2342 0.000 4.90 0.026
18 Vermis_6 3 −72 −8 4.86 0.030
7 Parietal_Sup_R 26 −58 54 4.74 0.048
6 17 Calcarine_L −8 −92 6 378 0.000 4.08 0.423
19 Calcarine_L −20 −66 6 3.97 0.556
17 Calcarine_L −12 −82 6 3.91 0.617
Main effect actors 1 7 Parietal_Sup_L −28 −60 46 374 0.002 4.96 0.020
2 44 Frontal_Inf_Oper_R 42 10 28 471 0.000 4.89 0.027
45 Frontal_Inf_Tri_R 42 24 22 4.01 0.500
45 Frontal_Inf_Tri_R 46 34 16 3.97 0.548
3 37 Fusiform_R 40 −44 −18 396 0.001 4.88 0.028
37 Temporal_Inf_R 42 −58 −10 4.76 0.045
4 44 Frontal_Inf_Oper_L −36 8 28 252 0.012 4.33 0.209
n/a Frontal_Inf_Tri_L −38 20 24 3.66 0.875
45 Frontal_Inf_Tri_L −42 28 18 3.44 0.979
5 37 Ternporal_Mid_R 36 −58 14 332 0.003 4.11 0.395
40 n/a 30 −56 34 4.04 0.469
19 n/a 32 −64 28 3.94 0.587
Main effect reference 1 37 Ternporal_Mid_R 54 −58 6 21483 0.000 12.62 0.000
37 Ternporal_Mid_R 48 −64 12 11.49 0.000
19 Occipital_Mid_L −48 −74 4 11.27 0.000
2 6 Frontal_Sup_L −26 −6 55 851 0.000 5.97 0.000
3 20 Ternporal_Mid_R 50 −10 −18 307 0.005 5.08 0.012
20 Fusiform_R 42 −16 −20 3.62 0.903
4 6 Frontal_Sup_R 30 −6 60 598 0.000 5.00 0.017
n/a Frontal_Mid_R 24 12 42 4.56 0.093
6 Precentral_R 40 0 46 4.01 0.504
5 6 Supp_Motor_Area_L −4 10 56 236 0.016 4.76 0.045
6 Frontal_Sup_L −14 10 50 3.83 0.716
6 27 Lingual_R 6 −34 −4 479 0.000 4.64 0.072
27 n/a −8 −28 −4 4.31 0.222
27 Thalamus_L −16 −30 6 3.84 0.702
7 44 Precentral_L −44 6 20 299 0.005 4.42 0.153
6 Precentral_L −42 −4 32 4.27 0.253
Listed are the MNI-coordinates for the ﬁrst three local maxima for each signiﬁcant cluster in the relevant comparisons (p<0.05 corrected cluster-level, threshold
p<0.001 uncorrected voxelwise). Anatomical labels are derived from the Automatic Anatomical Labeling atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) and from Brodmann’s
atlas. Cluster-level statistics are listed for each cluster, voxel-level statistics also for local maxima.
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FIGURE 3 | Results. Shown are the effect of sense masked
exclusively for reference, for reference masked exclusively for sense,
and the conjunction of the two. p <0.05 cluster-level FWE corrected
for simple effects, maps thresholded at p <0.001 voxelwise
uncorrected, exclusive masks thresholded at p <0.20 voxelwise
uncorrected.
information on, for instance, space, time, intentionality, causa-
tion and protagonists (Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998). These are
integrated and updated over several sentences and also contain all
inferencesthatwerenotexplicitlystatedbutarenecessaryforcom-
prehension(ZwaanandRadvansky,1998).Thedifferencebetween
reference as discussed above and situation models is that the latter
pertain to the integration of referents of several utterances into
one mental model and also contain unstated information,arrived
at through inferences. A similar distinction is likely in produc-
tion: the situation model may contain any information that the
speakerknowspertainstothesituation,butthathedoesnotmen-
tion. Right inferior frontal gyrus has repeatedly been found to be
involved in generating inferences (Mason and Just, 2004; Kuper-
bergetal.,2006).Theﬁrstpresentationof areferentmaytherefore
induce the start of situation model construction. This same area
did not show enhancement in the control experiment, support-
ing the idea that the process in which this region is involved is
language-related.We do not currently have an explanation for the
enhancement effect found in right middle temporal gyrus in the
control experiment.
The second main step in semantic encoding is to map the rep-
resentation that we want to talk about onto a linguistic structure
thatcanbesyntacticallyencoded–theactualprocessof encoding.
This would presumably involve areas sensitive to both reference
and sense, interfacing between the mental representation of the
situation that will be described and the linguistic representation
describing it. What is perhaps most striking about our data,is the
greatextenttowhichthesetwoprocessesareneurallyintertwined:
bilateral posterior middle temporal gyri (BA 37), superior pari-
etal areas (BA 7), precentral gyrus (BA 6) and LIFG (BA 44/6)
all show largely overlapping suppression effects for reference and
sense. Our data show that large parts of the language network
are involved in processing reference, and that reference therefore
presumably is important throughout much of the task of build-
ing an utterance. But what is the contribution of all these areas
to semantic encoding? Due to the proximity of areas coding the
perceptual representation of the referent and some of the areas
involved in processing both reference and sense, we hypothesize
thatthebilateraltemporalareassensitivetoreferenceandsenseare
primarily involved in mapping one onto the other. Such mapping
requires the retrieval of the relevant lexical items from the men-
tal lexicon, which indeed has often been postulated to involve the
posterior middle temporal gyrus (Hagoort, 2005; Jung-Beeman,
2005). The bilateral superior parietal lobes also showed suppres-
sion to the repetition of both reference and sense. These parietal
areas have previously been found involved in studies investigating
linguistic inference (Nieuwland et al.,2007; Monti et al.,2009). In
the sense/reference fMRI study discussed in the introduction, the
parietal areas were more strongly activated for both referentially
ambiguousandanomalousconditionscomparedtocoherentcon-
ditions, but this effect was more pronounced for the ambiguous
condition(Nieuwlandetal.,2007).Inastudyonlinguisticandlog-
ical inference, this area was found to be common to both types of
inferencecomparedtodetectionofgrammaticalviolations(Monti
et al., 2009). Our suppression effect in this area may reﬂect that
in a situation where sense, reference, or both are repeated, less
inferences are required than in a situation where that is not the
case. The superior LIFG (BA6) also showed suppression both to
repetition of sense and of reference. On the hypothesis that IFG is
involvedinunifyingdifferentelementsintoacoherentrepresenta-
tion(Hagoort,2005),thismeansthatthereferenceof anutterance
is also kept active in the working space of language. The fact that
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Table 3 | Results from control experiment.
Effect Cluster BA Anatomical label Global and local maxima Cluster-level Voxel-level
xyz K p T p (FWE)
Main effect reference
suppression
1 39 Temporal_Mid_L −44 −64 16 885 0.000 6.42 0.000
37 Temporal_Mid_L −54 −54 4 4.97 0.015
19 Occipital_Mid_L −34 −76 26 3.26 0.996
2 39 Temporal_Mid_R 40 −62 18 1379 0.000 5.66 0.001
21 Temporal_Mid_R 46 −56 12 5.34 0.009
37 Temporal_Mid_R 50 −66 6 5.31 0.009
Main effect reference
enhancement
1 21 Termporal_Mid_R 56 −24 −8 275 0.010 5.22 0.005
Reference masked for sense 1 39 Temporal_Mid_L −44 −64 16 695 0.000 6.42 0.000
37 Temporal_Mid_L −54 −54 4 4.97 0.015
39 Occipital_Mid_L −34 −76 26 3.26 0.996
2 39 Temporal_Mid_R 40 −62 18 1313 0.000 5.66 0.001
39 Temporal_Mid_R 46 −56 12 5.34 0.009
37 Temporal_Mid_R 50 −66 6 5.31 0.009
Conjunction reference
speaking and reference control
1 39 Temporal_Mid_L −44 −64 16 885 0.000 6.42 0.000
37 Temporal_Mid_L −54 −54 4 4.97 0.015
19 Occipital_Mid_L −34 −76 26 3.26 0.996
2 39 Temporal_Mid_R 40 −62 18 1346 0.000 5.66 0.001
21 Temporal_Mid_R 46 −56 12 5.34 0.003
37 Temporal_Mid_R 50 −66 6 5.31 0.003
Sense No signiﬁcant clusters
Actors No signiﬁcant clusters
Words No signiﬁcant clusters
Listed are the MNI-coordinates for the ﬁrst three local maxima for each signiﬁcant cluster in the relevant comparisons (p<0.05 corrected cluster-level, threshold
p<0.001 uncorrected voxelwise). Anatomical labels are derived from the Automatic Anatomical Labeling atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) and from Brodmann’s
atlas. Cluster-level statistics are listed for each cluster, voxel-level statistics also for local maxima.
none of the regions outlined above are sensitive to any of our fac-
tors in the control experiment further indicates that the process
they are involved in is linguistic in nature.
Theoutputof semanticencodingisthesense.Oneareashowed
a repetition suppression effect for sense but not reference: the
left inferior IFG (BA 45). The ﬁnal, linguistic, sense is apparently
assembled in LIFG. This effect may,however,also be partly due to
the repetition of the exact sentence, therefore by repetition of not
justsemanticbutalsobothsyntacticandphonologicalsequencing
processes, which are related to actual speech output and are not
partof thesense.Infact,thefocusof theeffect,lyingattheheartof
thepartof LIFGmostoftenfoundinvolvedinsyntacticprocessing
(Bookheimer, 2002), suggests just that. Ventral LIFG, most com-
monlyknowntobeinvolvedinmeaningprocessing(Bookheimer,
2002), remains sensitive to reference throughout.
Repetition of sense also elicits enhancement in two areas. The
exact same left hemispheric frontal and parietal areas here show-
ing repetition enhancement for sense have previously been found
to be involved in semantic inhibition (Hoenig and Scheef, 2009),
that is, inhibition of contextually inappropriate meanings. In the
present paradigm, each word (MAN, BOY, WOMAN, GIRL) has
two prominent possible referents. One of them has to be sup-
pressed in mapping the intended referent onto the sense. While
this would seem harder in the case where sense is not repeated
(and therefore elicit suppression instead of enhancement upon
repetition),this seeming incongruity can be readily explained: the
BOLD-response in both areas shows consistent deactivation in
any of the conditions compared to an implicit baseline. The deac-
tivations are less strong in the conditions with repeated sense,
than those where sense is novel. This mirrors activation patterns
in the so-called default mode network, which shows increasing
deactivations depending on task difﬁculty (Greicius et al., 2003).
Both areas have been shown to be part of the default mode
network.
In sum, our data suggest that the bilateral temporo-parietal-
occipital junctions are involved in constructing a mental repre-
sentation of a percept (the reference), that the bilateral posterior
middle temporal gyri map this representation onto lexical items
thatcanbeexpressed,andthattheﬁnalsenseisuniﬁedinleftinfe-
rior frontal gyrus – this can then serve as input to both syntactic
and phonological encoding which also involve left inferior frontal
gyrus.
Some caveats are in order: in operationalizing reference and
sense for the purpose of this study, we have made some deci-
sions that limit the generalizability of our ﬁndings. Most notably,
ourexperimentsconcernvisualrepresentationsofconcreteevents.
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As we have stressed above, we consider referents to be men-
tal representations in our mind. These mental representations
are likely to differ depending on the material underlying them.
They will likely be different for auditory and visual objects, for
events involving people and for non-human objects, for con-
crete objects and for abstract concepts. But that is precisely
the point: our brains need to convert non-linguistic mental
(i.e., conceptual) representations, whatever they are “made of”
into language. Therefore, while we believe our ﬁndings con-
cerning sense, and the mapping of reference onto sense will at
least to a large extent hold irrespective of the underlying ref-
erence, what brain areas are involved in processing reference
alone will depend on the speciﬁcs of the mental representation
involved.
Another constraint concerns our task. We had participants
describe a long list of pictures. If these subsequent sentences were
to be perceived as part of an ongoing discourse,then some unnat-
ural situations would arise: normally, we would avoid repeating
the same sentence twice in a row, let alone while using it to refer
todifferentthings.Ourbehavioraldata,however,provideanindi-
cation that participants were not too affected by such concerns.
First, the instructions speciﬁed that they had to name the people,
the colors, and the action (which was given by the verb presented
prior to the picture). Though this precluded using pronouns, this
did not prevent participants from adding speciﬁcations such as
“the other,” “again,” “now,” etc., to specify the relation between
pictures. No participants chose to do so. Second, if repeating the
sentence were more difﬁcult than not repeating it,we should have
seen an inhibitory effect of priming. While we did see this in the
speaking times, we did not in the planning times, and the total
time taken to compete an utterance was shorter for the primed
thantheunprimedconditions.Theseareindicationsthatourpar-
ticipants were happy to consider every trial an independent unit.
Webelievethatsinglesentenceprocessingisconceptuallythesame
as discourse processing, but on a smaller scale. Therefore, we pre-
dict our general ﬁndings would hold for more natural processing
of language in context.
To conclude, our data conﬁrm that the theoretical distinction
between reference and sense is psychologically real, both in terms
of behavior and of neuroanatomy. The behavioral data shows that
priming of both processes can affect the ease of production. The
fMRI data shows that indeed some brain regions are selectively
affected by one of these computations. However, the neuronal
infrastructure underlying the computation of reference and sense
is largely shared in the brain. This indicates that processing ref-
erence and sense is highly interactive throughout the language
system.
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